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We noted earlier that lengthening the period used to compute rates of
change eliminates short, erratic movements but reduces only moderately
the amplitude of the fluctuations in money and nominal income, leaving
long, relatively smooth swings (sec. 9.3, especially chart 9.4). Chart 11.1
highlights this phenomenon. It gives rates of change computed from
three, five, seven, and nine successive phase averages for money in panel
A, nominal income in panel B, real income in panel C, and price level in
panel D.
11.1 Past Work on Long Swings
For the United States, these long swings are members of the same
species as those that have been studied by Kuznets, Burns, Abramovitz,
and other investigators. That is clear from table 11.1, which compares
three earlier chronologies for the United States with the turning points in
our rate of change series for money, nominal income, and real income.
1
1. See Simon Kuznets, "Long-Term Changes in the National Income of the United
States of America since 1870," Income and Wealth in the United States, Trends, and
Structure, Income and Wealth Series, vol. 2 (Cambridge: Bowes and Bowes, 1952),
pp. 29-241; "Quantitative Aspects of the Economic Growth of Nations. I. Levels and
Variability of Rates of Growth," Economic Development and Cultural Change 5 (October
1956): 1-94; "Long Swings in the Growth of Population and Related Economic Variables,"
Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society 102 (February 1958): 25-52; Capital in
the American Economy: Its Formation and Financing (Princeton: Princeton University
Press for the NBER, 1961), pp. 54, 316-88. The dates in table 11.1 are from the latter
source, p. 352, referring to GNP, based on decadal levels in 1929 prices.
Arthur F. Burns, Production Trends in the United States since 1870 (New York: NBER,
1934), pp. 174-252, esp. p. 196. Burns gives two sets of dates, one that regards his decade
rates of growth as the slopes of secular trends at the midpoint of the decade, the second, in
terms of decades of rapid and slow growth. The dates given in table 11.1 are the former,
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For our series, we have entered every turning point, regardless of the size
of the movement. As the average durations at the foot of the table show,
the three-phase rates yield cycles roughly comparable in length to those
dated by Abramovitz, though somewhat shorter; the nine-phase rates,
longer cycles intermediate in length between those dated by Kuznets and
by Burns. The exact dating differs somewhat for our three series, and, for
each series for matching three-phase and nine-phase turns. However,
there are comparably large differences among the dates assigned by the
other investigators, and there is clearly more than a family resemblance
among all the dates.
For the United Kingdom we have no satisfactory independent chronol-
ogies, despite a number of studies of long swings in the United Kingdom
patterned after the Kuznets study for the United States. These studies
examine the same phenomena but for the most part have not attempted
to settle on a specific chronology.
2 Table 11.2 therefore gives only the
since the method used seems more nearly comparable with that implicit in the dating of the
money series.
Moses Abramovitz, Resource and Output Trends in the United States since 1870, NBER
Occasional Paper 52 (1956; reprinted from American Economic Review 46 [May 1956]:
5-23), pp. 19-23. See Hearings on Employment, Growth and Price Levels, Joint Economic
Committee, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., part 2: "Historical and Comparative Rates of Produc-
tion, Productivity, and Prices" (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1959),
411-66, for an excellent summary and analysis of the evidence on long swings in the rate of
growth. The dates in table 11.1 are from his "The Nature and Significance of Kuznets
Cycles," Economic Development and Cultural Change 9 (April 1961): 225-48. They are
designated as referring to swings in "economic activity or GNP."
See also Abramovitz, Evidences of Long Swings in Aggregate Construction since the Civil
War, NBER Occasional Paper 90 (1964); R. A. Easterlin, The American Baby Boom in
Historical Perspective, NBER Occasional Paper 79 (1962), and his Population, Labor Force
and Long Swings in Economic Growth (New York: Columbia University Press for NBER,
1968); Manuel Gottlieb, Estimates of Residential Building, United States, 1840-1939, NBER
Technical Paper 17 (1964), and his Long Swings in Urban Development (New York:
Columbia University Press for NBER, 1976).
2. See in particular Brinley Thomas, Migration and Economic Growth (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1954), and P. J. O'Leary and W. Arthur Lewis, "Secular
Swings in Production and Trade, 1870-1913," Manchester School 23 (May 1955), reprinted
in [American Economic Association] Readings in Business Cycles, ed. R. A. Gordon and L.
R. Klein (Homewood, 111.: Irwin, 1965), pp. 546-72.
The one long swing that has been identified by some United Kingdom investigators is a
slowdown in United Kingdom growth rates in the 1880s and early 1890s. Others dispute this
finding, in particular, S. B. Saul, The Myth of the Great Depression (London: Macmillan,
1969), whose main focus is fifty-year swings (so-called Kondratiev cycles) rather than the
twenty-year swings that are the subject of this chapter.
Thomas does provide a more extensive chronology, by giving dates of the British building
cycle in his table 52, p. 175. For our period, these show a trough in 1871, peak in 1899,
trough in 1912, and peak in 1920. Thomas notes that these give cycles inverse to those in the
United States but of the same average duration.
Kuznets, in Economic Growth of Nations (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971),
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turning points in the three-phase and nine-phase rates of change com-
puted from our United Kingdom money, nominal income, and real
income series.
The three-phase rates yield longer swings for the United Kingdom than
for the United States. For nominal and real income this difference reflects
primarily the pre-World War I period. For the period after World War I,
the swings in real income are on the average slightly shorter for the
United Kingdom than for the United States; in nominal income, slightly
longer. For the period before World War I, we are uncertain whether the
longer recorded swings in the United Kingdom than in the United States
reflect a real phenomenon or simply the unsatisfactory and highly in-
terpolated measurements for the United Kingdom. For money the situa-
tion is different. The longer United Kingdom swings reflect not only
pre-World War I experience, but also the post-World War II period
when it took so much longer in the United Kingdom than in the United
States for velocity to recover from the war.
It is clear from chart 11.1 that the nine-phase rates for the United
Kingdom retain only two major swings, one for each of the two wartime
and postwar periods, plus a final upsurge in money and nominal
income but not real income. (Note that, although table 11.2 identifies
1888.5—the first observation for the nine-phase rates—as a peak for real
income, one can see on the chart only essential flatness in the observa-
tions before World War I; there is no cycle in real income until after
World War I.) To judge from our data alone, it is doubtful that, with the
exception of wartime and postwar periods, the United Kingdom experi-
enced long swings comparable to those of the United States economy.
This ambiguity is consistent with the absence of anything like a consensus
on a pre-World War I chronology of United Kingdom long swings and
the difficulty that investigators have had in establishing the existence of
long swings in the United Kingdom. The absence of long swings in real
income is also consistent with our finding in chapter 9 that, excluding
wars, the rate of change of real income in the United Kingdom seems to
be a random series.
Australia, and the United States for the pre-World War I period. He reports deviations
from straight-line trends in the rate of growth of per capita output, population, and total
output between successive decades, each pair of decades separated by five years. He gives
no chronology, but the peaks and troughs for the United Kingdom in the reported devia-
tions for per capita and total output show only one full swing with perhaps an initial half
swing. The dates are: initial peak, 1867; trough 1874-75; peak, 1889-90; trough, 1904-5,
implying a swing averaging twenty-five years in duration, or only slightly longer than those
Kuznets identified for the United States. His final peak corresponds to the initial peak in
column 7 of table 11.2.
Kuznets gets swings for Germany and Sweden roughly comparable to those for the
United Kingdom but swings for Australia that are inverse to those for the European
countries.602 Long Swings in Growth Rates
The long swings etched by the undulations in chart 11.1 for the United
States clearly correspond to widely diffused movements common to an
extraordinary variety of economic and quasi-economic phenomena—
from gross capital expenditures by railroads to immigration, from non-
farm residential construction to fertility of different population groups,
from nonagricultural prices and shares traded on the New York Stock
Exchange to number of patents issued.
3 The swings are present not only
in real income but also in money and nominal income: indeed, the most
striking feature of the chart is the decidedly larger amplitude of the
swings in money and nominal income than in real income.
The less clearly marked and milder swings in real income in the United
Kingdom than in the United States correspond to less clearly marked and
milder swings in money. Where this is not the case, as during the wartime
years when the United Kingdom monetary swings are as wide as those in
the United States, the swings in real output are also as wide as those in the
United States.
Yet in all the extensive literature on long swings, there is hardly a
mention of money! The only studies we know of that explore the role of
money in long swings are the second edition (1973) of Brinley Thomas's
book (the original study is cited in footnote 2 above) and an unpublished
study by Moses Abramovitz that was stimulated by an earlier draft of this
book.
4 Two survey articles on long swings deal only with series in real
terms: one uses fifteen such series for Sweden and the United Kingdom,
as well as four for the United States; the other uses thirty British series.
5
3. Kuznets, Capitalin the American Economy, pp. 321,352; Abramovitz, Long Swings in
Aggregate Construction, p. 35; Easterlin, American Baby Boom, p. 25; Burns, Production
Trends, pp. 223-41.
4. Thomas notes that in the first edition of his book, "Monetary influences were not
ignored, but they did not form an important part of the mechanism of interaction" (p. 246),
which stressed real factors. In the second edition he assumes that "A monetary cobweb is
superimposed on the real instability inherent in the interplay of the real magnitudes"
(p. 250) in the period 1870-1913. Moses Abramovitz ("The Monetary Side of Long Swings
in U.S. Economic Growth," Memorandum no. 146, Stanford University Center for Re-
search in Economic Growth, April 1973) proposes a model of United States long swings in
which nominal income growth and its handmaiden, money stock growth, are governed by
the growth rate of the sum of current merchandise and net capital imports.
Saul's study of the United Kingdom, 1873-96, is another exception to the general
omission of a role for money. He concedes that money is "the oldest [explanation] and is one
which could have the all-pervading effects mentioned" (p. 16) and "that we may have to put
money back where it used to be as a major force in the price movement" (p. 19).
5. Benjamin P. Klotz, "Oscillatory Growth in Three Nations," Journal of the American
Statistical Association 60 (September 1973): 562-67; John C. Soper, "Myth and Reality in
Economic Time Series: The Long Swing Revisited," Southern Economic Journal 41 (April
1975): 570-79.
Kazushi Okhawa and Henry Rosovsky in Japanese Economic Growth: Trend Accelera-
tion in the Twentieth Century, Studies of Economic Growth in Industrialized Countries
(Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1973) stress long swings in Japanese economic603 Past Work on Long Swings
Kuznets in a conclusion to a 1958 article says, "long swings would
probably be found in a much wider range of phenomena . . . than was
indicated above. For example, they would presumably be evident in the
financial aspects of economic performance and structure," to which he
adds three sentences elaborating on this possibility.
6 Aside from this one
reference, we have found no mention of money or monetary phenomena
in any of Kuznets's writings on long swings.
7 Similarly, the leading British
article on long swings, by O'Leary and Lewis, does not mention money.
8
The omission of money from the studies of long swings doubtless
reflects the prevailing Keynesian temper at the time the basic studies
were undertaken—characterized as it was by the view that "money does
not matter."
9 The omission of money from later studies reflects the
tendency of later investigators to stay in well-worn ruts rather than to
strike out for themselves. In light of our own findings about the relation
between changes in the quantity of money and in nominal and real
income, as well as the wider amplitude of the long swings in money than
of the associated long swings in real output, it may well be that Hamlet
has been left out of the long-swing drama.
This chapter does not explore in detail the relation between long
swings in monetary and real magnitudes—we leave that to investigators
concerned more centrally with long swings. Our aim is much more
modest: (1) to call attention, as we have already done, to the existence of
long swings in money and to their apparent temporal association with the
long swings that have been studied so extensively in real phenomena; (2)
to indicate the relevance of our data to the question whether the swings
are episodic or cyclical; and (3) to make some tentative suggestions about
the way monetary changes are diffused through the economy and spread
out in time.
development related to the absorption of advanced foreign technology by the Japanese
modern sector.
6. Kuznets, "Long Swings in Population Growth and Related Economic Variables."
This paper is reprinted in Kuznets, Economic Growth and Structure (New York: Norton,
1965), pp. 328-78; quotation from p. 352.
7. For example, his book Economic Growth of Nations contains no entry in the index
under money, or monetary.
8. O'Leary and Lewis, "Secular Swings in Production and Trade."
9. A monetary role in long swings is logically entirely consistent with Keynes's pure
theory, through the effect of monetary change on interest rates and thereby on investment.
However, the view that "money does not matter" led to a complete neglect of this
possibility.
Somewhat paradoxically, a rigid simple quantity theory—which regards long-run output
as determined independently of monetary changes—would rule out any role for money in
long swings. However, no scholar immersed in the quantity theory approach of the pre- or
post-Keynesian era would neglect to consider the possible role of money—as we have been
led to do.604 Long Swings in Growth Rates
11.2 Are the Swings Episodic or Cyclical?
The widespread diffusion of the swings through the economy and their
apparent smoothness over time are consistent with their being either
episodic or cyclical. Let the economy, or some sector of it, be affected by
a large "disturbance"—that is, an unsystematic movement, whether
favorable or unfavorable—and the disturbance will affect sectors other
than those in which it arose, some immediately, some after a lag. These
secondary disturbances will in turn produce further effects, including a
feedback to the sector in which the disturbance arose. The question is
whether the appearance of smooth swings in rates of change is produced
by such reactions to occasional episodic disturbances, plus the effect of
the statistical devices used to smooth the series,
1
0 or whether they reflect
an internal cyclical mechanism that converts a reasonably steady stream
of disturbances into a roughly periodic and recurring pulsation.
Earlier investigators have tended to favor the cyclical interpretation,
though recognizing that it is far from established, and have offered
tentative hypotheses about the cycle-generating mechanism. The neglect
of monetary phenomena has meant that the suggested mechanisms all
rely on real phenomena. In light of our own results, these hypotheses are
either wrong or, at the very least, seriously incomplete. They are wrong if
the monetary phenomena play a significant role in generating the
observed swings. They are incomplete even if the monetary phenomena
are simply reflections of independent real swings because they do not
account for the systematic monetary changes that accompany the real
swings.
One technique that has been used extensively in the attempt to deter-
mine whether the swings are episodic or cyclical is spectral analysis.
1
1
Since spectral analysis is a purely descriptive technique, it is not con-
taminated by defects in the theoretical explanations that have been
offered for the real swings. However, because the spectral analysis has
relied solely on real series, it has failed to use all of the information
available. This failure is particularly unfortunate because the results of
spectral analysis have so far been inconclusive, interpreted by some
investigators as rejecting the existence of long swings, except as episodic
disturbances, by others as mildly favoring that hypothesis.
1
2
10. This possibility has been suggested and explored by Bird, Desai, Enzler, and Taub-
man, "'Kuznets Cycles' in Growth Rates: Their Meaning," International Economic Review
6 (May 1965): 229-39.
11. See, for example, J. P. Harkness, "A Spectral-Analytic Test of the Long-Swing
Hypothesis in Canada," Review of Economics and Statistics 50 (November 1968): 429-36;
M. Hatanaka and E. P. Howrey, "Low Frequency Variation in Economic Time Series,"
Kyklos 22, no. 3 (1969): 752-63; E. P. Howrey, "A Spectrum Analysis of the Long-Swing
Hypothesis," International Economic Review 9 (June 1968): 228-52.
12. See Soper, "Myth and Reality in Economic Time Series," for a convenient summary.605 Are the Swings Episodic or Cyclical?
The rough temporal coincidence between the swings that earlier inves-
tigators found in real magnitudes, the swings in our real income series,
and the swings in the stock of money suggests that the real and monetary
swings are part of the same process and require a common explanation.
In A Monetary History we examined in detail the sources of the large
changes in the United States in rates of monetary growth. We concluded
that each had a fairly straightforward specific explanation. We attributed
the four successive substantial rises recorded in chart 11.1 to the reaction
to successful resumption of specie payments in 1879, the development of
a commercially feasible cyanide process for the extraction of gold, the
financing of World War I, the reaction to the Great Contraction plus the
financing of World War II. We attributed the four successive substantial
declines to the worldwide price decline in the 1880s exacerbated by silver
agitation and terminating in the deep depression of the early 1890s, the
tapering off of the gold expansion plus the 1907 panic, the post-World
War I monetary contraction, which, in the severe smoothing imposed by
the nine-phase rates of change merges into the even more drastic mone-
tary contraction from 1929 to 1932, and, finally, the cessation of the rapid
monetary expansion of World War II.
We have not made a similarly exhaustive study of United Kingdom
monetary history. However, the two wars and postwar periods were
characterized by essentially the same pattern of monetary growth in the
United Kingdom as in the United States. In the interwar period there is a
substantial difference: based on midpoint dates of our three-phase rates
of change, United States monetary growth declines sharply from 1924 to
1931 and only then starts to rise to a World War II peak; United Kingdom
monetary growth rises sharply, though irregularly, from 1923 to 1941 with
only a minor dip marking the Great Contraction. This difference can
plausibly be attributed to the different foreign exchange policies: the
United States retention of gold until 1933, the United Kingdom depar-
ture from gold in 1931. In the pre-World War I period, British monetary
growth, as recorded, is much stabler than United States growth, rising
moderately in response to the rise in the international supply of gold and
then settling back along with United States monetary growth as that
impact was absorbed.
These events seem mostly episodic rather than cyclical in character.
They are, of course, linked. The worldwide decline in prices expressed in
terms of gold before 1890 must have stimulated the search for gold and
for better processes of extracting gold from low-grade ore. World War I
certainly set in motion political forces that played a part in the strains
leading to World War II. In the United States, the monetary panic of 1907
played a large role in producing the agitation for monetary reform that
led to the enactment of the Federal Reserve Act and so to the establish-
ment of the monetary institutions that served as the channel of wartime606 Long Swings in Growth Rates
inflation and that were responsible for the severe monetary contractions
of 1919-21 and 1929-33. The severe post-World War I contraction in the
United Kingdom plus the effects of the return to gold in 1925 certainly
laid the groundwork for the early departure from gold in 1931 and the
accompanying and subsequent rapid monetary growth. However, these
links are of the general kind that connect all major historical events. It is
hard to see in them the kind of economic self-generating long cycle
mechanism that is embodied in the tentative hypotheses offered by
earlier investigators.
While this evidence favors an episodic interpretation of the long
swings, it is not decisive. It can be rendered consistent with the self-
generating long cycle mechanism in two different ways.
1. It can be maintained that the reaction mechanism of the economy to
a major episodic disturbance is cyclical in character, but damped, so that
the cycle would die away unless another major disturbance occurred to
keep it going. If the damping is assumed to be substantial, the explana-
tion is indistinguishable from a simple episodic explanation, hence it must
assume relatively slow damping, so that many observed swings are not
episodic.
2. It can be maintained that the particular dramatic events we associ-
ate with the monetary changes took the form they did and had the
monetary effects they had only because the underlying self-generating
cycle mechanism produced a climate favorable to them. Had the same
"disturbances" occurred at a different stage of the cycle, they might have
passed off without important consequences. Plausible examples are the
deep depression of the 1890s and the panic of 1907. In both cases it can be
maintained that, unless there had been underlying real forces working for
retardation in rates of growth of output, the silver agitation in the earlier
case or the failure of a number of banks in the later would not have
triggered appreciable monetary contraction. It is much more difficult, on
the qualitative evidence available to us, to accept a similar interpretation
for the other episodes.
The principal events that are candidates for "random disturbances,"
the smoothing of which might be regarded as generating the long swings
are clearly, for the United States, the deep contractions that have punctu-
ated American economic history since at least as far back as 1808, and for
both the United Kingdom and the United States, the major wars. One
way, therefore, to get some evidence bearing on the episodic or cyclical
character of long swings is to determine the extent to which the long
swings reflect these two categories of events.
In order to use phase averages for this purpose, we divided the phases
into two sets: "special" phases, which correspond to the wars and deep
contractions for the United States and to wars alone for the United
Kingdom, and "other" phases, which correspond to the "usual" or607 Are the Swings Episodic or Cyclical?
"normal" expansions and contractions. In doing so, we treated as deep
contraction phases not only the contraction phases themselves, but also
the following expansion phases, because of the finding in our other work
that there is a close relation between the amplitude of contractions and of
succeeding expansions (though not of preceding expansions).
1
3 The suc-
ceeding expansion, as it were, reflects a reaction to, or a rebound from,
the deep contraction. Put differently, we treat the period from a peak to a
subsequent peak as a deep contraction, containing a contraction and an
expansion phase. For the same reason we include as a war phase the
expansion phase following the contractions that started at the end of the
wars (1918-19 and 1944-46). In all, for the period from 1873 to 1975 for
the United States and 1874 to 1975 for the United Kingdom, we classified
six phases as war phases and, for the United States, an additional eleven
phases as deep contraction phases.
1
4 Since our rates of change are based
on triplets of phases, the rate of change associated with a phase just
preceding, or just following, a special phase is affected by the special
phases. Accordingly, in the analysis of rates of change which follows, we
treat ten observations as corresponding to war phases—for the six war
phases proper plus the two that precede and follow each triplet of war
phases—and, for the United States, twenty-five observations as corre-
13. A Monetary History, pp. 97, 139, 173, 241, 493; "The Monetary Studies of the
National Bureau," in The National Bureau Enters Its 45th Year, 44th Annual Report (June
1964), pp. 14-18. Reprinted in M. Friedman, The Optimum Quantity of Money (Chicago:
Aldine, 1969), pp. 271-75.
14. The phases classified as war phases are:
Contraction Expansion













The phases classified as deep contraction phases for the United States are as follows:







We classify both 1892-94 and 1895-96 as deep contractions because the troubled situation of
the period straddled two contraction phases. The 1938-44 expansion is also classified as a
war phase, and hence reduces the number of deep contraction phases to eleven.608 Long Swings in Growth Rates
sponding to all special phases.
1
5 For the United Kingdom, there remain
twenty-five observations corresponding to other phases, for the United
States, twenty-two. In terms of years covered, the special observations
for the United Kingdom cover twenty-three of the 101 years in the period
as a whole; for the United States they cover about half of the 102 years in
the period as a whole.
The importance of the special observations in determining the ampli-
tude of fluctuations in our series is brought out dramatically by chart 11.2.
In each panel, the first pair of curves (part 1) shows the actual rates of
change—for money and nominal income in panel A for the United
States, panel B for the United Kingdom; for prices and real income in
panel C for the United States, panel D for the United Kingdom. The
second panel (part 2) shows hypothetical rates of change in which the
special observations are replaced by the average value of the other
observations. Eliminating the special observations eliminates the bulk of
the variability in the series. Moreover, even some of the variability that
remains seems fairly clearly to be a reaction to the special observations—
particularly for nominal income for the United Kingdom. It would be
hard to justify a long-swing hypothesis as more than random perturba-
tions on the basis of the nonspecial observations alone. If there is any
kind of a nonepisodic long swing, wars and deep depressions must be of
its essence.
Tables 11.3 and 11.4 supplement the graphs, table 11.3 for means,
table 11.4 for variance. For both countries the war phases, as we have
noted repeatedly, are characterized by high average rates of growth in
money, nominal income, and prices. Real income grew at a higher rate
during wars in the United States than during all other phases,
1
6 but at a
somewhat lower rate in the United Kingdom. The United States nonwar
deep depression observations are, as expected, at the opposite extreme
from the war observations: lower rate of growth in all variables than
during nonspecial phases.
Table 11.4 is more significant for the present purpose. It allocates the
total variability of rates of change to various sources depending on the
type of observation. Taking all special together,
1
7 for the United States,
they account for 54 percent of the degrees of freedom, but for 81 to 95
percent of the variability, so that the variation per degree of freedom of
the special observations is between three and a half and fifteen times as
15. Adding phases that precede and follow each set of deep contraction phases, listed in
note 14 above, gives a total of twenty phases. Five of these are included in the ten
observations corresponding to war phases. Hence, other special phases number fifteen, for
a total of twenty-five.
16. The average value for the thirty-seven nonwar observations is 3.0.
17. The inclusion of the one degree of freedom "between special and other" with special
rather than with other is called for by the hypothesis being tested, namely, that the "other"
phases are the "norm," so that the difference in means between the special and other phases
is to be attributed to the special ones.609 Are the Swings Episodic or Cyclical?
large as per degree of freedom of the other observations.
1
8 The only
interesting feature of the more detailed sources of variation is that for the
nominal magnitudes (money, nominal income, and prices), the one de-
gree of freedom corresponding to the difference between the war and
nonwar deep depression observations accounts for 44 to 48 percent of the
variance, reflecting the wide difference between the corresponding
means in table 11.3. For real income, on the other hand, this degree of
freedom contributes 16.5 percent.
For the United Kingdom, the war observations account for twenty-
nine percent of the degrees of freedom, but for from 60 to 69 percent of
the variability, so that the variation per degree of freedom of the war
observations is between three and five times as large as per degree of
freedom of the other observations.
1
9 Once again, the one degree of
freedom between war and other observations is extremely important for
the nominal magnitudes, much less so for real income.
These results simply confirm the tale of charts 11.1 and 11.2: wars and
deep depressions are the major source of wide variability in money,
nominal income, prices, and real income. Unless these events can be
regarded as integral parts of a self-generating long swing, the empirically
observed swings must be regarded as reflecting episodic phenomena
smoothed both by the economic reaction to them and by the statistical
treatment of the economic data.
The importance of deep depressions for the United States, and their
apparent unimportance for the United Kingdom, seems to us further
evidence against the cyclical interpretation. In A Monetary History we
concluded the United States deep depressions reflected predominantly
monetary collapse. On that interpretation, the difference between the
two countries for the periods concerned is readily explained by the
difference in monetary institutions and history. The United Kingdom
during this period had some serious monetary disturbances—as in 1890
connected with the Baring crisis—but it had no major financial panics of
the kind that were experienced in the United States.
2
0 On the other hand,
18. These F values would be exceeded by chance distinctly less than one-tenth of 1
percent of the time.
19. For money, nominal income, and prices, the F ratios would be exceeded by chance
less than 1 percent of the time; for real income, less than one-tenth of 1 percent of the time.
20. Baring Brothers was threatened with insolvency in November 1890 as a result of
imprudent investments in issues of the governments of Argentina and Uruguay. The Bank
of England thereupon mobilized a guarantee fund of £17m., subscribed to by the bank and a
syndicate of private and joint stock banks, to enable the Barings to discharge their obliga-
tions in an orderly way over a period of years. There was no panic on the Stock Exchange, no
run on banks, no internal drain of funds, no external run on sterling. See Sir John Clapham,
The Bank of England, 1694-1914 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1945), 2:326-
39; L. S. Presnell, "Gold Reserves, Banking Reserves, and the Banking Crisis of 1890," in
Essays in Money and Banking in Honour ofR. S. Sayers, ed. C. R. Whittlesey and J. S. G.

































































































































































































































































the hypothesis that observed experience reflects primarily a self-
generating long swing in real output produced by real forces cannot be
accepted without a persuasive explanation of why these forces should
have produced such different results in the two countries—an explana-
tion that is at the moment notable by its complete absence.
11.3 The Role of Money in Long Swings
The episodic character of the long swings is consistent with a small set
of economic variables playing a crucial role in their occurrence and
diffusion, and the same set playing that role in all long swings. The
variables could be peculiarly subject to disturbance and closely linked to
other activities, and hence a likely bridge for the diffusion of disturb-
ances; or, alternatively, they could be an essential element in the trans-
mission mechanism, so that disturbances, wherever they originate, have
diffused effects if and only if they trigger changes in such variables.
Our results strongly suggest that the quantity of money is such a key
variable: for both the United States and the United Kingdom, the ampli-
tude of changes in the quantity of money and the associated nominal
magnitudes (nominal income and prices) is much wider than in real
output; monetary institutions can be the source of serious disturbances,
and the greater susceptibility of the United States institutions to such
disturbances than of the United Kingdom institutions seems a likely
source of the different incidence of deep depressions in the two countries;
money is a pervasive element throughout the economy, so changes in the


















































































































II l620 Long Swings in Growth Rates
through which other disturbances are transmitted. Wide variability in the
quantity of money is associated with wide variability in nominal income
and real income both within the United States and the United Kingdom,
between the two countries, and among a much wider range of countries.
2
1
We conclude that substantial changes in monetary growth are very likely
both a necessary and sufficient condition for the emergence of substantial
long swings in economic activity.
11.4 The Transmission Mechanism
Chapter 2 gives a theoretical analysis of the way changes in the quantity
of money are transmitted to other variables and why a change in mone-
tary growth is likely to give rise to a cyclical reaction pattern in nominal
income, prices, real income, and interest rates. Chapters 5 through 10
document this process empirically. They demonstrate the close empirical
relation between monetary changes and contemporaneous and subse-
quent changes in other magnitudes. Most important, for the present
purpose, they demonstrate the gradual nature of the adjustment process
and the long time it takes for a monetary change to be fully reflected in
other phenomena, in particular, in public anticipations about the future
behavior of prices.
A swing produced by monetary disturbances can, on the basis of this
evidence, be expected to take a considerable time, as the observed swings
do, and to display a consistent pattern of reaction of both nominal and
real magnitudes, as the observed swings do. Our purpose has led us to
concentrate on aggregates, but the same reasoning leads one to expect
that monetary disturbances will produce systematic patterns in the reac-
tion of such components of output as construction, other investment,
consumption, and so on.
It follows that there is no inconsistency between our tentative judg-
ment that changes in monetary growth are a crucial element in the
generation of long swings and the finding of other investigators that there
are systematic long-swing patterns in the behavior of real output.
11.5 Summary
Our chief conclusions can be stated briefly. First, Hanlet has been left
out of most work to date on long swings. Second, those swings appear to
represent smoothing of episodic disturbances rather than an internal
cyclical mechanism that produces a roughly periodic and recurrent
pulsation.
21. See J. R. Lothian, "The Demand for High-Powered Money," American Economic
Review 66 (March 1976): 56-68; A. A. Walters, Money in Boom and Slump, 3d ed., Hobart
Paper 44 (London: Institute of Economic Analysis, 1971); M. Friedman and A. J. Schwartz,
"Money and Business Cycles," Review of Economics and Statistics 45, suppl. (February
1963): 32-64.